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Abstract
We model a duopoly in which two-sided platforms compete on both sides of a two-sided
market. Platforms (or intermediaries) select the quality they oﬀer consumers, and the prices
they charge to consumers and ﬁrms. In this model, non-trivial competition on both sides induces
non-quasiconcave payoﬀs in one subgame. All equilibria are characterized. Under well-deﬁned
conditions, the unique equilibrium in pure strategies can be computed. Prices entail a discount
on one side, a premium on the other one and the quality oﬀered to consumers is distorted
downward. When the pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist, a mixed-strategy equilibrium is
shown to always exist and the distributions are characterized. In this case, the market may be
preempted ex post. The model may ﬁnd applications in the media, internet trading platforms,
the software industry or even the health care industry (HMO/PPO).
Keywords: two-sided market, vertical diﬀerentiation, industrial organization, platform
competition. JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D43, D62, L13, L15.
∗School of Economics, UNSW. Email: g.roger@unsw.edu.au, Tel: +612 9385 3323. I am indebted to Guofu Tan
for his continuing support during this project, and most grateful to Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean J. Gabszewicz
for helpful conversations. Thank you to Carlos Pimienta, Suraj Prasad, Francesco Sobbrio, and Luis Vasconcelos for
patiently reading earlier versions. This paper has also beneﬁted from the comments of seminar participants at the
4th Workshop on Media Economics (Washington DC), USC, Melbourne, the Wharton School, CRA (Boston), the
ANU, Auckland, Monash and UNSW.
11 Introduction
“The only thing advertisers care about is circulation, circulation, circulation.”
Edward J. Atorino, analyst
Fulcrum Global Partners, New York
June 17, 2004 (The Boston Globe).
In many markets, the standard modus operandi requires ﬁrms to satisfy two constituencies: for
example, consumers on one side and advertisers on the other in the case of media, or policyhold-
ers and service providers for HMOs and PPOs. Their behaviour is typically analysed as that of
platforms competing in a two-sided market. But unlike e-Bay, say, whose only purpose is to facili-
tate transactions between buyers and sellers, a medium provides an information (or entertainment)
good to attract consumers. Likewise, HMOs and PPOs typically diﬀer in the characteristics of the
service they oﬀer to their policyholders.1 We develop a model of platform competition in which
a) the quality of the consumer good is endogenous; and b) competition cannot be reduced to the
sole problem of attracting consumers. That is, players compete on both sides of the market. This
latter characteristic generates the main contributions of this paper. When competition is not trivial
on both sides, the equilibrium diﬀers markedly from the results typically found in the industrial
organization literature.
The game has three stages: quality setting (inducing vertical diﬀerentiation), price setting to
consumers and price setting to advertisers. All the equilibria of the game are characterized. A
unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists only when advertising is not too lucrative (in a sense made
precise). This requires showing existence of, and computing, the unique Nash equilibrium of a
pricing game with non-quasiconcave payoﬀs. This problem falls outside the premises of standard
existence theorems ([7], [4], [18]). Only [5] presents a general existence theorem, but is silent as to
uniqueness and characterization. Beyond a well-deﬁned threshold, the quality-adjusted price of the
high-quality ﬁrm is so low that it preempts this side of the market, and consequently the other one
as well. This fails to be an equilibrium as the excluded ﬁrm possesses a non-local deviation and
1For example, PPOs are known to oﬀer access to a larger diversity of physicians, while HMOs put more emphasis
on cost containment. The rest of the paper will make use of the media vernacular for concreteness so we will speak
of consumers and advertisers, but the reader should bear in mind other applications such as the health care industry
or software development.
2monopolize the market. Then platforms must play in mixed strategies. Existence of an equilibrium
is veriﬁed in spite of discontinuous payoﬀ functions. Equilibrium strategies are fully characterized
and entail a mass point.
Beyond the characterization result we show that, when a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, the
optimal quality level of the top ﬁrm is lower than in a well-established benchmark (Shaked and
Sutton,[23]). Quality and advertising become substitutes for the platforms. In the Shaked and
Sutton problem, a high quality is a means of extracting consumer surplus at the cost of giving away
market share to the competition. Here every consumer becomes more valuable because the platform
can extract surplus from advertisers as well, therefore advertisers cross-subsidize consumers. Given
lower prices, the quality level required to induce the marginal consumer to purchase from the high-
quality platform decreases, hence the substitution eﬀect. When playing in mixed strategies, the
market may be preempted ex post, which is a distinct feature of two-sided markets in practice. In
this model it owes not to a contraction of the consumer market but rather to an expansion of the
other side, which induces more competition for consumers.
This article departs from two often-cited applied papers by Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac
([10], hereafter GLS) and Dukes and Gal-Or ([8], now DGO) in the following manner. In these
constructs, platforms act as bottlenecks between advertisers and consumers. They become monop-
olists in the advertising market, by each oﬀering sole access to their respective set of consumers.2
In GLS this is an immediate consequence of the speciﬁc form of ‘multi-homing’ assumption: an
advertiser may place at most one (of two available) advert on each platform, which prevents plac-
ing both ads on the same medium. It is a substantive assumption with the consequence that price
competition on the advertising side vanishes. It results in a neat computation of the unique and
symmetric equilibrium. These outcomes cannot be replicated when competition is preserved on
the advertising market.3 In DGO the bottleneck eﬀect owes to the additive (hence, separable)
nature of the objective function. In the present paper, competition is re-introduced in the form of
a ‘single-homing’ assumption: advertisers may place at most one ad. From [6] and [13] we know
that multi-homing typically tames competition directly on the side that multi-homes, and there-
2In GLS, the revenue function at the advertising pricing stage of the game is independent of the competitor’s
price. There is no proper subgame at that stage of the game. In the same spirit, in DGO the bargaining stage is
independent across media.
3For example, if advertisers were simply allowed to place two ads on the same medium if they so wished.
3fore indirectly on the other side. In contrast, single-homing (for advertisers) implies competition on
the advertising side, and therefore more intense competition for consumers. One could argue that
whether agents multi-home or single-home should be determined as an equilibrium outcome, not
debated as an assumption. In the Appendix we show this is a moot point. What is really important
for the characteristics of an equilibrium is whether there exists competition on both sides. A general
formulation should allow for any quantity to be purchased from any provider. Some speciﬁcations
of the returns on advertising (e.g. Cobb-Douglas) lead to payoﬀ functions for the platforms that
are akin to the multi-homing assumption; that is, they shutdown competition in advertising. Other
speciﬁcations do preserve competition, as does the simpler single-homing assumption. Thus relying
on single-homing yields qualitatively identical results: what matters is that platforms compete for
the marginal unit – in the case of single-homing, the only unit. Besides technical implications,
single homing ﬁnds some empirical support in [15] in the context of German magazines.
In the next section we set the paper in the context of the relevant literature, then we introduce
the model. Section 4 covers the characterization and Section 5 speaks to the role of externalities.
All proofs are sent to the Appendix, as well as some additional technical material.
2 Literature
Rochet and Tirole ([19],[20]), Armstrong ([2]) and Caillaud and Jullien ([6]) are the seminal refer-
ences when it comes to studying two-sided markets. The works closest to this paper are [10] and
[8], which this paper complements. When a pure-strategy equilibrium exist, our results resemble
DGO’s equilibrium, which they call ‘minimal diﬀerentiation’. However here it owes not to any
nuisance cost of advertising, but to the increased value of each consumer. The quality distortion
that obtains then is intermediate to the GLS equilibria of maximal or no diﬀerentiation, and varies
smoothly with the size of the advertising market. In both these papers the only mixed-strategy
equilibria that exist are trivial ones, and cannot result in ex post pre-emption. Armstrong and
Weeds (2005) study public versus commercial TV broadcasting and also allow for a quality vari-
able. In their model however, quality is not a strategic instrument since it enters the demand
function as an (already) price-adjusted variable. In contrast to GLS, [9] take the locations as ﬁxed.
Gabszewicz and Wauthy ([12]) do consider endogenous costless quality, however with the option
4of multi-homing. [1] conduct a welfare analysis of the broadcasting market; advertising may be
underprovided, depending on its nuisance cost and its expected beneﬁt to advertisers. There is no
direct competition between broadcasters for the advertisers business. In [17] it is shown that when
advertising volumes feed back into the consumers’ utility, it is as if platforms were competing in
advertising (“pecuniary externality”) however indirectly through the consumer demand for media
(see also [22] for a more general formulation). In the context of healthcare, Bardey and Rochet
([3]) allow for competition for policy holders (consumers) through quality and prices, but there is
no direct competition for service providers. [13] studies commitment problems in setting prices on
one side of the platform to attract participants on the other one.
This work is also related to an older strand of the industrial organisation literature. Building
on [11], [23] shows that when ﬁrms compete in a vertical diﬀerentiation model, their proﬁts, prices
and market shares are ranked according to their quality choices.
3 Model
There are two platforms, identiﬁed with the subscripts 1 and 2, and a continuum of consumers of




following a continuous, uniform distribution. All consumers value quality in the sense of vertical
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Our ﬁrst assumption is standard and rules out the trivial case in which the low-quality platform
necessarily faces zero demand in the price game.
Assumption 1 β − 2β > 0
5Advertisers have a proﬁt function A(y,x) separable in x,y; x ∈ {0,1} denotes advertising
consumption and y is a vector of variables orthogonal to x. These include any other action a
platform may undertake. Let Di denote the quality of platform i as perceived by the advertisers:
the more consumers any advertiser can reach, the more they value an ad, and e be a scaling
parameter.4 For any ˆ y, advertisers may choose to purchase at most one unit of space at price pA
i
if eDi [A(ˆ y,1) − A(ˆ y,0)] − pA
i = eDia − pA
i ≥ 0; i = 1,2. That is, they derive an increase in
(expected) proﬁt a. The one unit limit is a convenient way of ensuring competition on this side of
the market and can be interpreted as a tight liquidity constraint. Advertisers may value the beneﬁt
from advertising diﬀerently according to the parameter a, which is also uniformly distributed on
[α,α] with mass 1. They act as price takers and there is no strategic interaction between them.
We assume neither constraint on advertising space, nor that advertising aﬀects readership (see
Remark 4).5 The cost of running adverts is set at zero. Quality however is costly to provide and
is modeled as an investment with cost kθ2
i, where we impose
Assumption 2 k >
(2−)2
18
for an interior solution in the benchmark case.6 Taken together, Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee
that the consumer market is covered in equilibrium, which greatly simpliﬁes the analysis (see
Section 7.2). We also rule out exogenous preemption on the advertising side, i.e.
Assumption 3 α − 2α > 0
Externality: The ranking of the platforms’ market shares on the consumer side deﬁnes their






and coverage DR = (DR
1 ,DR
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4The advertisers payoﬀs are independent of the consumers’ ‘identity’ (preferences for media). This spares us
a signaling game between consumers and advertisers: media consumption would then provide information about
preferences for commoditities.
5A capacity constraint is either trivially exogenous, or endogenous as in [16], which may induce a quantity-setting
game instead of the price game.
6In the absence of a suﬃciently large parameter k the Shaked and Sutton boundary result prevails.
6Game: Platforms ﬁrst choose a quality level simultaneously. Given observed qualities, they each
set prices to consumers, who make purchasing decisions, and in a third stage, to advertisers. Upon
observing these prices, advertisers choose whether to purchase. This sequence captures the facts
that a) consumer prices (cover prices or subscription rates) are more diﬃcult to change than
advertising rates, and b) readership is often reported to advertisers (ex ante and ex post, with
potential rebates). It also aﬀords us the use of the subgame-perfect equilibrium concept, while
pricing to consumers and advertiser simultaneously would require to use a rational expectation
framework. The three-stage game is denoted Γ. A platform collects revenues from both sides, with














i = Ri(pA,pR,θ) − kθ2
i (3.1)
4 Equilibrium characterization
We proceed in two steps, starting with the advertising market where the ﬁrms’ behavior is not
directly aﬀected by quality choices.
4.1 Advertising market subgame
The last subgame replicates the result of the classical analysis of vertical diﬀerentiation. Let
e∆DR = e(DR
1 − DR
2 ) denote the diﬀerence in the platforms’ quality. Then equilibrium payoﬀs
take a simple form in the last stage, for which the proof is standard and therefore omitted.
Lemma 1 Suppose DR
1 ≥ DR
2 w.l.o.g. There may be three pure strategy equilibria in the adver-
tising market. When DR
1 > DR
























2 , the Bertrand outcome prevails and platforms have zero proﬁts.
Following Lemma 1 the proﬁt function (3.1) rewrites
Πi = pR
i DR






on the equilibrium path, where consumer demand for the commodity takes the form DR









∆ − β for θi > θj thanks to Assumptions 1 and 2. As usual, ∆θ = θi − θj and











Remark 1 Consider now the Hotelling setup applied to the present model. Using GLS notation,
at this stage of the game, proﬁts would write
Πi = (pi − c)ni + eA(ni − nj)
Πj = (pj − c)nj + eA(ni − nj)
whenever ni > nj, where ni ≡ ni(pi,pj) is i’s consumer demand and pi the consumer price. In GLS
an equilibrium is always symmetric: ni = nj, in which case the second term is always naught. But
this cannot be an equilibrium in our construct: any ﬁrm could alter its location marginally, lower
its consumer price marginally at receive a ﬁrst-order gain eA(ni − nj), A = A,A. The reason is
that proﬁts in the present game are a function of the consumer demands of both platforms, not
just of one player.
4.2 Consumer price subgame
From Lemma 1 three distinct conﬁgurations may arise on the equilibrium path. In the ﬁrst case
platform 1 dominates the consumer market, in the second one both share the consumer market
equally and in the last one it is dominated by ﬁrm 2. Hence the proﬁt function (4.1) of each ﬁrm
i = 1,2 rewrites
Πi = pR
i DR
i (pR,θ) − kθ2
i +

   
   
Π
A











This function is continuous with a kink at the proﬁle of consumer prices ~ pR such that DR
1 =
DR
2 . More importantly it is not quasi-concave, which follows from the externality generated by
advertising revenue and induces discontinuous best responses. Thus the conditions of Theorem 2
of [7] are not met, and neither are those of [18]. The suﬃcient conditions (Proposition 1) of [4] also
fail here as the sum of payoﬀs does not satisfy diagonal quasi-concavity, so their existence result
cannot be readily applied.7 Proceeding by construction it is nonetheless possible to show that a
7A recent contribution (subsequent to the writing of this paper) by Philippe Bich establishes existence by intro-
ducing a measure of the lack ofquasi-concavity that resembles ironing [5]. Our construction does remain essential in










Figure 1: Best replies and unique equilibrium
unique equilibrium in pure strategies always exists. This demonstration is left to the Appendix,
Section 7.3; here we discuss it brieﬂy and focus on its outcome, which takes a simple form. At face
value an equilibrium has a ﬂavour of rational expectations, in that platforms must select actions
that are ‘consistent’ with each other (for example, both must play as if DR
1 > DR
2 or the converse),
as well as compatible with an equilibrium. Such a rationality requirement is not necessary. First,
from (4.2), it is immediate that any price proﬁle pR such that DR
1 = DR
2 is dominated. Next





2 (for example, p2,p
2 in Figure 1), from which we can construct the true best replies
– discontinuous at the points ˆ p1, ˆ p2. In a penultimate step, we derive a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for existence, that is, for these best responses to intersect. Last, this condition is veriﬁed
by construction for one of two candidate equilibria. To paraphrase Dasgupta and Maskin [7], the
discontinuity of the best replies is essential: the discontinuity set is not trivial and even mixed
strategies cannot restore this second candidate equilibrium. This is depicted in Figure 1. Thus we
need not call on the rational expectation framework. Elimination of weakly dominated strategies
is suﬃcient to rule it out and play a less strenuous Nash equilibrium. For example, an outcome
such that θ1 > θ2 and D1 < D2 entails playing a weakly dominated strategy for player 2: if she
ﬁnds it attractive to reduce her price that much, so must player 1. But the intuitive reasoning
whereby the low-quality ﬁrm may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to behave very aggressively in order to access
9large advertising revenue does not hold true (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix).8 Jumping to the
result, we can state
Proposition 1 Consumer prices. Let θ1 > θ2 w.l.o.g. There may be two possible conﬁgurations
arising in the consumer price subgame. For each, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies characterised as




































Consumer prices include a discount as platforms engage in cross-subsidisation. The lure of adver-
tising revenue intensiﬁes the competition for consumers because they become more valuable than
just for their willingness to pay for the information good. Unlike in [23], β−2β > 0 is not suﬃcient
to aﬀord the low-quality ﬁrm some positive demand: ∆θ, deﬁned in the ﬁrst stage, may be too
narrow to sustain two ﬁrms. That is, the high-quality platform may choose to act so as to exclude
ﬁrm 2 endogenously.
4.3 First-stage actions
In the ﬁrst stage, platforms face the proﬁt function (4.2), which they each maximise by choice of





























8That is, playing i < 2 but oﬀering a very low price p
R





10The constraint does not limit quality choices per se but is a natural restriction guaranteeing that
the endogenous threshold ˆ β remain within the exogenous bounds [β,β].9 On the equilibrium path,


















































A is a constant. The second line of the deﬁnition of
Π1 rules out the artiﬁcial case of ﬁrm 1 facing a demand larger than the whole market. It is derived
by taking C
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2, if ∆θ(β − 2β) > 2e(A + A);
0, ∆θ(β − 2β) ≤ 2e(A + A) and θ2 = 0;
−kθ2
2, ∆θ(β − 2β) ≤ 2e(A + A) and θ2 > 0;
(4.5)








A. Some diﬃculty may arise in solving this problem
as the proﬁt functions are not necessarily well-behaved. Section 7.5 of the Appendix studies the
proﬁt function Π1(θ1,θ2) in the details necessary to support our results. In particular it identiﬁes
a threshold Cf such that the function admits a binding ﬁrst-order condition if C does not exceed
Cf. We ﬁrst focus on this case. This is illustrated in Figure 2 (the higher curve corresponds to the
complementary case of C > Cf). The solid lines represent the ﬁrst part, and the dashed ones the
second part, of (4.4).
4.3.1 Pure-strategy equilibrium
For C < Cf the function Π1(.,.) remains increasing (and concave) on the portion beyond θ1 =
˜ θ(e) ≡ θ +
√
C
−2, where it admits a maximiser. To ensure this is the case, Assumption 3 is
strengthened and turned into





Figure 2: Proﬁt functions for diﬀerent values of advertising















both platforms operate (see Proposition 1). Collecting the results from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1,
and letting platform 1 be the high-quality medium w.l.o.g., we can ﬁnally state
Proposition 2 Pure-strategy equilibrium. Suppose Assumption 4 holds. The game Γ admits a
unique equilibrium in pure strategies in which both platforms operate and choose diﬀerent qualities.




deﬁned by Proposition 1, Lemma 1, and
the optimal actions θ∗
2 = θ and θ∗
1 = ˆ θ1, where ˆ θ1 uniquely solves
(2β − β)2 = 18kθ1 +
C
(∆θ)2 (4.6)
We label the term C
(∆)2 the ‘cross-market eﬀect’: it acts as an incentive to reduce quality. In
condition (4.6), ﬁrm 1 trades oﬀ the marginal beneﬁt of quality (the left-hand side) not only with
its marginal investment cost but also with the marginal advertising proﬁt that it must forego
because of higher consumer prices induced by higher quality (the RHS). Given that it markets a
lesser good, platform 2 selects θ to mitigate the price war. This is the Diﬀerentiation Principle at
work, but here it is subsumed by the cross-market eﬀect.
10This arises from the condition (ˆ 1   )(   2) > (
f






27k is deﬁned in
Section 7.5.
12Proof: The optimality of θ∗
2 = θ and θ∗
1 = ˆ θ1 is established by Lemma 5, in the Appendix
(Section 7.6). The rest of the claim follows immediately under Assumption 4.
Proposition 2 can be appended with an immediate corollary, for which we omit the proof.
Corollary 1 If a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Γ exists, platforms may also play in mixed
strategies.
This is a simple coordination game where each event θ∗
i = θ or θi = ˆ θ is a mass-point.
4.3.2 Mixed strategies
When Assumption 4 is not satisﬁed, the necessary ﬁrst-order condition (4.6) fails to hold entirely.
As can be seen on Figure 2, the high-quality medium would like to pick the point ˜ θ(e) ≡ θ+
2e(A+A)
−2 ,
where Π1(.,.) reaches is maximum. At that point its rival is excluded (∆θ is low enough), and ﬁrm
1 still extracts as much surplus from consumers as it can without losing its status as monopolist.
But then ﬁrm 2 can ‘leap’ over it and become the monopolist at a negligible incremental cost
kθ2
1−k(θ1+ε)2. Intuitively, when advertising returns are large enough every consumer becomes very
valuable to both platforms. It is not immediate that the game admits a mixed strategy equilibrium,
for the payoﬀ correspondences are not upper-hemicontinuous and their sum is not necessarily so
either.11 Nonetheless it is possible to show that a mixed-strategy equilibrium always exists, which
we do in Section 7.7 of the Appendix. [24] provides an appealing approach to characterize mixed
strategies in a problem of entry with sunk cost, but it does not quite apply here. Indeed there is no
proper entry stage and the payoﬀs depend not just on the ranking of the ﬁrms’ decisions (θ1,θ2),
but on the diﬀerence θ1 − θ2. In particular, playing θi = θ cannot be interpreted as a decision
to not enter the market because Πi(θi,θj) > 0 for θj such that ∆θ >
2e(A+A)
−2 . Let Hi(θi) be the
probability distribution over i’s play and hi(.) the corresponding density, ΘN
i the relevant support
of Hi and θc
i the upper bound of the support. Let also Ri(θi,θj) denote the revenue accruing to i.
We claim






, i = 1,2



























∈ (0,1), s = θi;
= 1, s = θc
i.
and





i deﬁned in Lemma 9.
Noticeably ΘN
i ⊂ [θ,θc] and platforms place some mass at the lower bound θ. Indeed it is obvious




is strictly dominated by selecting the
lower bound. This is because Πi(θi,θj) > 0 for θj > ˜ θ(e): if j plays anything in the support ΘN
j





. Expected proﬁts are naught of course.
Remark 2 The existence and characterisation of a mixed-strategy equilibrium is useful beyond
completeness. Suppose that consumer prices are exogenously ﬁxed at zero, as in the broadcasting
world. Then a pure-strategy equilibrium can never exist. The formal statement and proof of this
claim are left to the Appendix, Section 7.9.
Next we want to understand the impact of the externality e on players’ behaviour and on the
breakdown of the equilibrium.
5 The role of externalities
The results of the preceding analysis are ﬁrst contrasted with standard ones well established in the
literature [23].
5.1 Quality distortion and advertising revenue
A goal of this paper is to understand the behavior of quality in the presence of cross-market
externalities. To study this problem we take to be [23] (hereafter S&S) to be the benchmark. It is
easy to adapt their model to allow for costly quality.
14Proposition 4 Quality distortion. In any pure-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ, quality is
lower than it would be absent advertising.
Diﬀerentiation is known to soften price competition, but advertising revenue puts emphasis back
on market share. This leads to more intense price competition for consumers. Lower consumer
prices uniformly relax the need to provide costly quality: at lower prices, the marginal consumer
demands a lesser product to make a purchase. More precisely, given any quality, in the second
stage ﬁrms must oﬀer a discount to consumers. The extent of that discount, given ﬁxed quality,
is determined by proﬁts to be collected on the advertising market: it increases in the advertising
proﬁts. In the quality-setting stage, the high-quality ﬁrm can further increase this discount by




∆θ(2β − β) + 2e(A − 2A)
]





∆θ(β − 2β) + 2e(2A − A)
]
. This may go on until the quality spread is so narrow that ﬁrm
2 faces preemption (∆θ ≤ 2e(A + A)/(β − 2β) – which is not an equilibrium). This phenomenon
resembles that observed in industries such as software or game development: a widely used operating
system need not provide the highest intrinsic quality because it supports so many applications.
5.2 Taxonomies: externalities and diﬀerentiation
Consistent with our claim to contrast our results against those of the current literature, we present
a taxonomy of outcomes in two parts.
Proposition 5 Taxonomy I: k > 0. Let θ∗
1 > θ∗
2 w.l.o.g.,
For e = 0 The equilibrium is that of Problem 4 (adapted from S&S) with both ﬁrms operating;
For ¯ e > e > 0 The equilibrium is characterised by Proposition 2;
For e > ¯ e There is no pure-strategy equilibrium. Proposition 3 applies.
and
Proposition 6 Taxonomy II: k = 0. Let θ∗
1 > θ∗
2. There exists some ˆ e > ¯ e > 0 such that
For ˆ e > e > 0 Maximum diﬀerentiation obtains with both ﬁrms having positive demand;
For e > ˆ e There is no pure-strategy equilibrium. Proposition 3 applies as well.
15Note that the case ˆ e > e > 0,k = 0 yields maximal diﬀerentiation, as in S&S and is therefore
equivalent to GLS (but of course the equilibrium is not symmetric). However this is only true as
long as e is bounded below ˆ e; that is, advertising is not too lucrative. Beyond that point, the
incentives resemble those of GLS, that is, ﬁrms seek to increase market share on the consumer side,
but competition is too stiﬀ for a pure-strategy equilibrium to be sustained – as in Propositions
2 and 3. Some comparative statics are informative, for which the derivations are collated in the



















de < 0. The presence of a second source of revenue not
only depresses the quality of the consumer good, it does increasingly so as the advertising market
becomes more valuable. Price competition is correspondingly more intense in the consumer market,
but less in the advertising market, where platforms become more diﬀerentiated.
Remark 3 Either Maximal (or minimal) Diﬀerentiation can obtain when k = 0 and GLS’ multi-
homing assumption is imposed. That is, the equivalence between vertical and horizontal diﬀer-
entiation is preserved in the GLS construct (see [10]). It no longer is if competition prevails on
both sides. As shown in Remark 1, no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium can exist in a Hotelling
model with single-homing. That is, Maximal Diﬀerentiation cannot hold – and neither does minimal
diﬀerentiation.
Remark 4 The model ignores whatever disutility consumers may suﬀer from advertising. In-
troducing such disutility would extend the range of parameters on which the pure-strategy equi-
librium can be sustained, as it reduces the value of advertising to the platform. It otherwise
does not modify the results qualitatively. To see why, rewrite the consumers’ utility function as
ui = θib − pR
i − δqA
i . Advertising demand is deﬁned as before, but suppose θ1 > θ2, consumer
demands are DR





∆ − β. The new term is δ∆qA: the utility
impact of the diﬀerence in advertising levels. For ﬁrm 2 to operate, DR
2 > 0 ⇔ ∆pR > ∆θβ −δqA,
as opposed to ∆pR > ∆θβ: ﬁrm 1 can price closer to ﬁrm 2, which still has positive market share.
In equilibrium, this implies that the spread ∆θ (which governs equilibrium prices) can also be nar-
rower. A disutility function reduces the value of the marginal advertiser from the perspective of
the platform. In other words, it modiﬁes the rate of substitution between surplus extraction from
consumers and from advertisers.
165.3 Properties of the mixed-strategy equilibrium
Although the distributions H1,H2 do not lend themselves to easy interpretation, more can be said
about the nature of the equilibrium. Here we claim
Proposition 7 Suppose e > ¯ e. When no platform plays at the lower bound θ, the market is
necessarily monopolised ex post. Otherwise both operate.
The dominated ﬁrm loses its investment kθ2
i because the length of the interval [˜ θ(e),θc] is not suﬃ-
cient to accommodate two ﬁrms because (θc−˜ θ(e)) < 2e(A+A)/(β−2β). So either monopolisation
or the competitive situation may be an ex post outcome, which ﬁts some industry patterns.12 The
results suggest an alternative rationale for an increased concentration in markets such as newsprint,
radio broadcasting or internet trading. According to this model, some players may be driven out
not because of a market contraction on the consumer side, but because of an expansion on the other
one. In addition ex post proﬁts in mixed-strategy case are not monotonically ranked: consider the
play ⟨θ1,θc
2⟩, which implies Π1 > Π2 = 0 although θ2 > θ1. This result also compares favourably to
some media idiosyncrasies, where the higher-quality shows do not necessarily yield higher proﬁts.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed an analysis of diﬀerentiation in a duopoly of two-sided platforms, where
competition prevails on both sides of the market. In this case, market share on one side not only
induces a ranking, but also a premium to being the better platform, on the other side. This
exacerbates the competition for consumers.
Restoring competition on both sides of the two-sided market yields markedly diﬀerent outcomes,
as compared to those typically found in the applied literature. When a pure-strategy equilibrium
exists, maximum diﬀerentiation is hampered because too costly in terms of market share, but
minimum diﬀerentiation cannot be an equilibrium either. Qualities can come so close to each other
that the low-quality platform becomes strictly dominated, at which point the equilibrium breaks
down. Then platforms play in mixed strategies. In addition, equivalence of horizontal and vertical
diﬀerentiation breaks down here.
12Only New York City has more than one signiﬁcant newspaper, for example. Or there is one largely dominant
online trading website.
17Our ability to compute an equilibrium rests on the simple structure chosen, and in particular
on the assumption of independence between goods’ consumption decisions and media consump-
tion decisions. This implies that advertisers only take into account the average consumer and
care only about coverage. Media strive to segment consumer markets (using real or perceived
correlation between media and commodity consumption) to better serve their advertisers; that is,
media consumption may be used as a signal of other consumptions choices. They also operate in
conglomerates. These important characteristics are so far left out and for future research.
7 Appendix
The Appendix contains some additional material as well the proofs of the propositions developed
in the main text. We begin by arguing in favor of the single-homing assumption this paper rests
on.
7.1 Justifying single-homing
Consider an advertiser (for concreteness) contemplating purchasing quantities q1,q2 from two inter-
mediaries (platforms), given some prices p1,p2. Let the payoﬀ function be av(y;D1q1,D2q2), i =
1,2, where a ∈ [α,α] ⊂ R is the advertisers’ type and Di the consumer coverage of platform i. We
suppose that v(.) is increasing and concave in each of its argument, that its third derivatives are
positive (complete monotonicity) and that vq1q2 ≥ 0. Suppressing the dependence on the vector y,











where M is an exogenous “resource” constraint. This may be thought as a liquidity constraint or












. The function h(.) ≡ (vq1)−1 is the inverse of the marginal
payoﬀ, so it is decreasing and convex. From here we recover a demand function q1(q2,p1,p2,D1,D2)

























18by simple diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst-order conditions. So the demand (for each advertiser a) be-
haves in standard fashion. Integrating qi over the set of participating advertisers yields advertising





If we presume of the Inada condition at qi = 0 we can guarantee ourselves full coverage: Qi ≡
∫ 























for each type α. We know that h′(.) < 0 and diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition with respect








dpi > 0. More importantly, equation (7.1) directly













That is, (7.1) characterizes a reaction function, unlike in the GLS case where pi is independent of
pj. So, there is competition (in prices) at the advertising stage, and each ﬁrm’s proﬁts depend on






2 , for example, the reader can
verify that we revert to the GLS construct: price competition on the advertising side (in the last
stage of the game) is circumvented. Similarly if the advertiser’s payoﬀs are additively separable
(as in DGO). Thus what matters for competition to be preserved on the advertising side is not the
single-homing assumption, but the speciﬁcation of payoﬀ functions and the resource constraint.
7.2 The suﬃciency of Assumptions 1 and 2 for market coverage















13Refer section 5 for details of this equilibrium.
19example, Tirole, (1988)). Substituting for the values of θ0
1,θ0
2 and re-arranging, the market is cov-









, which is necessarily satisﬁed by Assumption 2. It follows that
both ﬁrms operate and the relevant demand functions in the consumer market are the competitive
ones. It will be obvious that it is satisﬁed in an equilibrium of this game.
7.3 Existence and characterization of a unique (price) equilibrium in pure
strategies










. The space PR
i × PR
−i of action proﬁles
(prices) can be divided into three regions: region I such that DR
i > DR
−i, region II such that
DR
i < DR
−i and region III such that DR
i = DR
i . We begin with











, where the proﬁt function is deﬁned by (4.2).
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While it is always possible to ﬁnd some point where ‘quasi-best responses’ intersect (e.g. such that
both play as if DR
1 < DR
2 ), it by no means deﬁnes an equilibrium. Doing so assumes that in some
sense platforms coordinate on a particular market conﬁguration – for example, such that DR
1 < DR
2 ,
which may not been immune from unilateral deviation. To ﬁnd the equilibrium, if it exists, we ﬁrst
need to pin down the ﬁrms’ true best replies.
Lemma 2 Let θ1 > θ2 w.l.o.g. There exists a pair of actions (ˆ p1, ˆ p2) such that the best response


















































, for p1 ≥ ˆ p1;
(7.3)
Lemma 2 thus deﬁnes the ‘true’ best-response of each player. It says that platform 1, for example,













reply correspondence is discontinuous at that point where platforms are indiﬀerent between being

















Proof: First notice from (4.2) that playing a proﬁle ~ pR such that DR
1 = DR
2 can never be a
best reply. When DR
1 = DR
2 advertising proﬁts ΠA
i are nil for both platforms. So both players
have a deviation strategy pR
i + ε in either direction since Π
A
i > ΠA
i > 0, i = 1,2 as soon as
DR
i ̸= DR
−i. Maximising the proﬁt function (4.2) taking p−i as ﬁxed leaves us with two ‘quasi-
reaction correspondences’, for each competitor, depending on whether DR
1 > DR
2 or the converse.








. Depending on ﬁrm 2’s decision,






























































. This quantity is the diﬀerence in
proﬁts generated by ﬁrm 1 when it chooses one ‘quasi-best response’ over the other, as a function
of the consumer price set by ﬁrm 2. For pR
2 suﬃciently low, g1(.) > 0. This function is continuous
and a.e diﬀerentiable, for it is the sum of two continuous, diﬀerentiable functions. Using the





















2 )2 = 0, whence there exists a point ˆ pR
2 such that g1(ˆ pR













2 ), ˆ pR
2
)
and platform 1 is indiﬀerent between these two proﬁt
functions, that is between either best response pR
1 (ˆ pR
2 ) or pR
1 (ˆ pR
2 ). The same follows for platform 2,
which deﬁnes ˆ pR


















2 ≥ ˆ pR
2 ≡ −
(




















1 ≥ ˆ pR
1 ≡ ∆θβ − e(A − A)
21For each ﬁrm, its action must be an element of the best reply correspondence and these cor-
respondences must intersect. We deﬁne a condition that captures both these features, and will
show next that it is both necessary and suﬃcient for an equilibrium to exist. From the ‘quasi-best








































An equilibrium exists only if these intersections are non-empty. Together, the deﬁnitions of a














Consider an action proﬁle p∗R satisfying this condition; from Lemma 2 each p∗R
i is an element of
i’s best response. Now, for it to be an equilibrium, players must choose reaction functions that
intersect. This is exactly what Condition 1 requires. For example, the ﬁrst pair of inequalities
tells us that player 1’s optimal action has to be low enough and simultaneously that of 2 must be
high enough. When they hold, player 2’s reaction correspondence is necessarily continuous until 1
reaches the maximiser p∗R
1 , and similarly for 1’s best reply. Then







exist. When both inequalities are satisﬁed, the game admits two equilibria.




1 ) has a closed graph and standard
theorems apply. The potential multiplicity of equilibria owes to the discontinuity of the best-reply
correspondences.
Proof: Since player i’s action set is PR
i ⊆ R, it is compact and convex. For each platform

















, on which the
22best-response correspondences deﬁned by (7.2) and (7.3) are continuous for each platform i. It can
be veriﬁed that the proﬁt function (4.2) is concave in its own argument in each of these domains,
but it is not immune from non-local deviation (that is, not quasi-concave over the whole set PR
i .






. By construction it is deﬁned as the intersection of
the ‘quasi-best responses’, which is not necessarily an equilibrium. But when Condition 1 holds,
following the deﬁnitions given by equations (7.2) and (7.3), either p∗R
1 ∈ pR
1 (pR







2 ) and p∗R
2 ∈ pR
2 (pR






the reaction correspondences necessarily intersect at least once, whence the Nash correspondence
























































, or both if two equilibria
exist. For the ﬁrst equality to hold, the ﬁrst line of Condition 1 must hold, and for the second one,
















. Condition 1 provides us with a pair of
easy-to-verify conditions in terms of prices. Thus we can establish
Lemma 4 Existence. An equilibrium in pure strategies of the consumer price subgame always
exists. It is unique and located in region I.












2 , respectively. Solving for the ﬁrst-order










































, hence the restriction DR












i = 0 i = 1,2, pR
j is determined by platform j’s reaction correspondence







23constitutes an equilibrium by Lemma 3. This equilibrium always exists because ˆ pR
1 ≥ p∗R
1 and ˆ pR
2 ≤
p∗R









≥ 0 is always true, or p∗R
2 = 0 > ˆ pR
2 and ˆ pR
1 > p∗R
1 can be immediately veriﬁed when only






can be constructed by letting platform
1 play as if ΠL
1 = pR
1 DR
1 (pR,θ) − kθ2
1 + ΠA
1 and platform 2 as if ΠL
2 = pR
2 DR

























































cannot exist, for these prices are not best response to each other. At the price-setting stage, the
cost of quality is sunk, so for θ1 > θ2 there always exists some price pR
1 ≥ pR
2 such that consumers









≤ 0. Given that ∆θ ≥
√
C
2−, take the lower bound and substitute into the
second line of Condition 1. Recalling
√







> 0, ∀β ≥ 0
which violates the second pair of inequalities of the necessary Condition 1. So the second candidate

















−i, there cannot be any local deviation. Consider now deviations involving
















always exists, the ﬁrst line of Condition 1 always holds.


























247.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Directly from Lemma 4, which establishes existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium. In partic-
ular no such alternative equilibrium can exist when ∆θ <
√
C















cannot be best responses to each other. At the price-setting stage, the cost of quality is sunk. So
with θ1 > θ2, there always exists some price pR
1 ≥ pR
2 such that consumers prefer purchasing from
platform 1.
7.5 Analysis of the high-quality ﬁrm’s proﬁt function
In the sequel θ1 > θ2 without loss of generality. The proﬁt function Π1(.,.) is obviously continuous
for θ1 < θ +
√
C
−2 or the converse. Furthermore, assume e < ∞, then




Proof: For ease of notation, let Π1 = ΠL
1 for all ∆θ ≥
√
C
−2 and Π1 = ΠR
1 otherwise. These are
the deﬁnitions of Π1(θ1,θ) to the left and the right of the point such that ∆θ =
√
C
−2 for any pair
(θ1,θ2). To the left platform 1 is a monopolist whose proﬁts ΠL
1 are necessarily bounded. The
function is deﬁned as ΠL
1 : Θ1 ×Θ2 ⊆ R2  → R, therefore Theorem 4.5 in Haaser and Sullivan ([14],
page 66) applies: a mapping from a metric space into another metric space is continuous if and
only if the domain is closed when the range is closed. So ΠL




and is necessary the left-hand limit of the same function ΠL








−2 from above for some ﬁxed θ2 . This sequence exists and always
converges for Θ1 ⊆ R is complete. As e < ∞ and A and A are necessarily bounded, C is ﬁnite so























25Π1(.,.) being the diﬀerence of two convex functions, its exact shape is aﬀected by that of these
two primitives. Indeed, when C becomes large enough, it is no longer well behaved.








such that Π1(.,.) admits a binding
ﬁrst-order condition for C ≤ Cf only. When C > Cf, its maximum is reached at the kink:
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(3∆)2 − 2kθ1 = 0, for ∆θ >
√
C






(3∆)2 − 2kθ1 < 0, for ∆θ >
√
C
−2 and C > Cf;
(7.4)




= ϕ(θ1), with slope
ϕ′(θ1) = 18k− 2C
(∆)3. Since ∆θ > 0, this FOC has at most two solutions: one where ϕ′(θ1) < 0 and
the other with ϕ′(θ1) > 0. The SOC requires ϕ′(θ1) ≥ 0 for the FOC to identify a maximiser, so
there exists a unique local maximiser of Π1, denoted ˆ θ1. Let θ0
1 be the (unique) maximiser of the ﬁrst
line of system (7.4). It is immediate that ˆ θ1 < θ0
1 and consequently θ0
1 − θ2 ≤
√
C
−2, θ1 ∈ BR1(θ2)
can never be true. That is, the two statements of the ﬁrst line of (7.4) cannot be simultaneously












Recall that the proﬁt function is continuous, so it does not jump anywhere. Because Π1
is monotonically increasing below ˆ θ1 and the SOC is monotonic beyond ˆ θ1, it is concave for
C ≤ Cf and ˆ θ1 is a global maximiser. The binding ﬁrst-order condition deﬁnes a function
C(θ1,θ2) ≡ (∆θ)2 [








27k . Substituting back into








. When C > Cf, the ﬁrst-order















26While this proﬁt function is not diﬀerentiable for ∆θ =
√
C
−2, it has been established that it is




that ˆ θ1 such that ∆θ =
√
C
−2, is the unique maximum of Π1(θ1,θ2) given some ﬁxed θ2.
Last in this section we examine the behavior of the quality variable θ1 when the ﬁrst-order
condition (7.4) does bind.





(∆)2 − 18kθ1 = 0, then dˆ 1
de < 0 and dˆ 1
dk < 0.












de ≥ (≤)0 ⇔ 2C − 18k(∆θ)3 = −(∆θ)3ϕ′(θ1)|1=∗
1 ≥ (≤)0 so that
d∗
1
de < 0 (assuming the SOC




de is not deﬁned and we need to consider the left derivative). The
second statement is similar: diﬀerentiate the ﬁrst-order condition of (4.4) to ﬁnd 2C(∆θ)−3 d1
dk −
18θ1 −18kd1
dk = 0, which is rearranged as d1
dk =
181(∆)3
2C−18k(∆)3. The denominator is exactly the SOC
of (4.4), which we know to hold, multiplied by (∆θ)3.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by characterising the ﬁrst-stage actions
Lemma 5 Let θ1 > θ2 w.l.o.g. and Assumption 4 hold. Optimal actions consist of θ∗
2 = θ and
θ∗
1 = ˆ θ1, where ˆ θ1 uniquely solves




Proof: First oﬀ the following simpliﬁes the analysis and lets us focus on platform 1’s problem.
Claim 4 In any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (θ∗
1,θ∗
2) such that θ∗
1 > θ∗
2, θ∗
2 = θ necessarily.
Proof: Assume the FOC (7.4) binds so that θ∗








−(β − 2β)2 + C
(∆)2 − 2kθ2 < −2kθ2, if ∆θ(β − 2β) >
√
C;
−2kθ2, if ∆θ(β − 2β) ≤
√
C.
27whence it is immediate that dΠ2
d2 |2> < dΠ2
d2 | < 0.
Next delineate an impossibility. When C is said to be ‘large’ the proﬁt function Π1(.,.) is no
longer well behaved, as shown in Section 7.5. This leads to








, a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies cannot exist.








an equilibrium because ﬁrm 2 can ‘jump’ and assume the monopolist’s role at incremental cost kε2.






(∆)2 − 18kθ1 = 0 and admits a unique maximiser ˆ θ1. This analysis does not yet identify an
equilibrium of this game but only platform 1’s behaviour, taking that of ﬁrm 2 ﬁxed. Suppose ﬁrm








is an equilibrium as long as ﬁrm 2 cannot ‘jump’ over ﬁrm 1 and become the high-quality
ﬁrm. It will necessarily do so if platform 1 turns out to be a monopolist. To guarantee ﬁrm 2
operates we need (ˆ θ1 − θ)(β − 2β) >
√
C – Assumption 4 must holds. When ﬁrm 2 does operate,







ˆ θ1, ˆ θ1 + ε
)
, or
(ˆ θ1 − θ)(β − 2β)2 + B2 + C
(ˆ 1−) ≥ B1 +
√
C(β − 2β) − 9k(ˆ θ1 + ε)2
(ˆ θ1 − θ)
[
(β − 2β)2 + (2β − β)2]
− 18kˆ θ2
1 + B2 ≥ B1 +
√
C(β − 2β) − 9k(ˆ θ1 + ε)2
(ˆ θ1 − θ)
[
(β − 2β)2 + (2β − β)2]
− 9kˆ θ2
1 + B2 ≥ B1 +
√
C(β − 2β)
using the FOC (2β − β)2 − 18kˆ θ1 − C
(ˆ 1−)2 = 0 and the fact that kˆ θ1θ = kθ2 = 0 (by assumption).
Noting ˆ θ1 − θ >
√
C
−2, this condition is generically satisﬁed.
7.7 Existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium
Proposition 8 A mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ always exists.
This assertion holds trivially by Corollary 1 when Assumption 4 holds. The balance focuses on the
case where it fails. The conditions of the Proposition guarantee that the market is covered – this
is Assumption 3. We need some preliminaries to establish the Proposition.
28Denote ˜ θ = θ+
√
C
−2 from now on. It is not immediate that the game Γ admits a mixed-strategy
equilibrium, for the payoﬀs are not everywhere continuous. First deﬁne by θc
1 the threshold such
that Π1(θc
1,θ) = 0 when θ1 > θ2. This point exists and exceeds ˜ θ1 because dΠ1
d1 |1>˜ 1 < 0 and the
cost function is convex. Neither platform will want to exceed that threshold, so we restrict the
set of pure actions over which ﬁrms randomise to be [θ,θc
i] ⊆ Θi, i = 1,2. Next, any distribution
over this set must assign zero mass to any θi ∈ (θ, ˜ θ) by Claim 4: any action in this interval is
dominated by either θ or ˜ θ. For [˜ θ,θc




−2, in which case both platforms are active, or ∆θ ≤
√
C
−2, in which case only the
high-quality ﬁrm operates. Take θ1 > θ2 > θ and suppose ∆θ >
√
C
−2 and Π1 > Π2 > 0. Let θ2
increase, both Π1 and Π2 vary smoothly. But while limn
2 ↑1 Π1 = Π1 > 0, limn
2 ↓1 Π1 = −kθ2
1,
and similarly for ﬁrm 2. Both payoﬀ functions are discontinuous at the point θ1 = θ2. In this case
neither the payoﬀs nor their sum are even upper-hemicontinous. Following Dasgupta and Maskin’s
(1986) Theorem 5, it is ﬁrst necessary to characterise the discontinuity set. If it has Lebesgue
measure zero, a mixed-strategy equilibrium does exist. Consider the case where θ1 ≥ θ2 w.l.o.g.
and deﬁne Υ0 =
{
(θ1,θ2)|θ1 = θ2,θi ∈ [˜ θi,θc
i] ∀i
}
, the set on which the payoﬀs are discontinuous.
Further deﬁne the probability measure µ(θ1,θ2) over the set ΘN = {θ1} ∪ [˜ θ1,θc
1] × {θ2} ∪ [˜ θ2,θc
2].
It is immediate that Υ0 has Lebesgue measure zero, so that Pr((θ1,θ2) ∈ Υ0) = 0. Next we claim
Lemma 7 Suppose θ1 = θ2 = θ, an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists in the consumer price
subgame.
As each platform’s payoﬀs are bounded below at zero and only one of them can operate (except at
pR
1 = pR




Proof: Let θ1 = θ2 = θ. The sum of proﬁts Π = Π1 + Π2 is almost everywhere continuous.
Either Π = Π1 > 0 ∀pR
1 < pR
2 , or Π = Π2 > 0 ∀pR
1 > pR
2 , both of which are continuous except
at pR
1 = pR








2 ) ∈ R2}
has
Lebesgue measure zero. Theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) directly applies and guarantees
existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Therefore the pair θ1 = θ2 = θ may be part of an equilibrium of the overall game. Then
Proposition 8 asserts that a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game Γ exists, which can now be
easily proven.
29Proof: We only need showing that the payoﬀ functions Πi i = 1,2 are lower-hemicontinuous
in their own argument θi. Without loss of generality, ﬁx θ1 > θ2. We know that Π1 is continuous
for any θ1 > θ2 (refer Section 7.5). From Claim 4 it is immediate that Π2 is continuous for θ1 > θ2.





0, if θ1 = θ2 = θ;
−kθ2
i, if θ1 = θ2 > θ.
that is, Πi, i = 1,2 is l.h.c. Since (θ2,θ1)s.t θ2 = θ1 ∈ Υ0, Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986) can be applied, whence an equilibrium in mixed strategies must exist.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Let θc
i denote the upper bound of the support of the distribution of the pure action space, a precise





. For any equilibrium mixing probability H∗
































with possibly an atom at θ1. With probability
∫ ′
1=2
˜ 1 d(H1 × H∗
2) it plays θ1 > θ such that
medium 2 is the dominant ﬁrm (θ2 ≥ θ1); in this case, Π1(θ1,θ2) = −kθ2




1=2 d(H1 × H∗
2) it is the dominant ﬁrm (the second integral). We ﬁrst claim
Lemma 8 There is a mass point at θi. More precisely, ∀ i, Hi(θi) ∈ (0,1).
Proof: Suppose H1(θ1) = 1, then argmaxE1 [Π2(θ1,θ2)] = ˜ θ2, so H2(θ2) = 0 and H2(θ2) assigns
full mass at ˜ θ2 : h2(˜ θ2) = 1. But then ﬁrm 1 should play some θ1 > ˜ θ2 and become the monopolist




and playing ˜ θ2 is a dominated strategy





, Π1(θ1,θ2) > 0 and
platform 1 should shift some mass to θ1.
The equilibrium conditions write ∀θi ∈ ΘN
i ,
Ej [Πi(θi,θj)] = Πi(θi, ˜ θj)
Πi(θi, ˜ θj) = 0
(7.6)
30The ﬁrst line asserts that i’s expected payoﬀ cannot be worse than if not investing for sure, in
which case j’s best response is ˜ θj. The second one sates that if not investing for sure, a platform
can only expect zero proﬁts. Thus expected proﬁts in the mixed-strategy equilibrium must be zero.
We next need to determine the upper bound θc
i of the support of Hi(θi) for each platform i = 1,2.

















i) = 0 and θ′′
i solve Πi(˜ θj,θ′′





is a measure θ′′
i − θ′
i on which i places zero weight. Then j should shift at least some weight to
θ′
i + ϵ, ϵ > 0 and small, to obtain E ˆ H(i) [Πj] > 0 = Ei [Πj(θi,θj)] (where ˆ H(.) is an alternative
distribution). Clearly this extends to any θi ∈ [θ′
i,θ′′
i ).




















where Ri(θi,θj) stands for platform i’s revenue (gross of costs). Hence Proposition 3, the proof of
which we complete below.
Proof: Existence is established by Proposition 8. For any play θj, total revenue Ri(θi,θj) is
decreasing in θi ∈ ΘN
i \ θi – refer Conditions (4.4) and (4.5). Thus for any distribution Hi(θi) ×
H∗
j (θj) the LHS is bounded as well, and decreasing in θi.
7.9 No charge to consumers (Remark 2)
In this section we study a constrained version of the problem, namely, when the consumer price is
exogenously ﬁxed at zero. First we show that
Lemma 10 When consumer prices are identical a pure strategy equilibrium cannot exist.
31Proof: Given pR
1 = pR
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1, if θi > θj;
1
2, if θi = θj; and
0, if θi < θj.










i ≥ 0, if θi > θj ≥ θ;
−kθ2
i ≤ 0, if θ ≤ θi ≤ θj;
Any proﬁle θ1 = θ2 can never be an equilibrium. Suppose so, then D1 = D2 and platforms are
Bertrand competitors in the advertising market, realising −kθ2
i ≤ 0 each. When −kθ2
i < 0, ﬁrm i
possesses a unilateral deviation: set θi = θ. When −kθ2
i = 0, it also possesses a unilateral deviation:
set θi > θ.
Therefore we have
Proposition 9 Fix pR
1 = pR
2 = 0. A pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. A mixed-strategy
equilibrium exists and is characterised as in Proposition 3.
Proof: Directly from Lemma 10. Existence is established in Proposition 8.
Proposition 10 admits a straightforward corollary.
Corollary 2 Fix pR
1 = pR
2 = 0. Platforms are monopolists on the advertising side except at
θ1 = θ2 = θ, where pA
1 = pA
2 = 0.
We refer to this as an irrelevance result: the other player’s action can be disregarded in the
advertising market. This result diﬀers from GLS however in that only one ﬁrm operates.
Proof: The proof follows directly from the fact that ﬁrms necessarily play a mixed strategy
equilibrium. Since θi ∈ ΘN
i ∀i, each event but θ1 = θ2 = θ has probability zero – see the atom from
Proposition 3. Therefore, except at θ, platform will be a monopolist in the advertising market with
certainty and the cost kθ2
i is sunk. Else they are Bertrand competitors.
7.10 Elements of Proof of Proposition 4 – unique subgame perfect equilibrium
of the Shaked and Sutton model
In the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model there exists a unique equilibrium in the price subgame. In





























, respectively. This problem is concave ∀i, and, given equilibrium prices p∗
i ∀i, has obvi-
ous maximisers θ0








1 < θ thanks to k >
(2−)2
18 . These individually












∀k > 0 14,
it is also true that
Claim 5   ˜ θ2 > θ0












Proof: Consider a deviation ˜ θ2 = θ0


















1 +ϵ) < 0.
This is the equilibrium characterisation of the benchmark model. To complete the proof of












− 2kˆ θ1 = C
(3∆)2 > 0. Therefore ˆ θ1 < θ0
1.
7.11 Proof of Propositions 5 and 6
For lines 1 and 3 the proof follows directly from Propositions 2 and 4, as well as the analysis of
Π1(.,.) in Section 7.5. When k = 0, because quality is a sunk cost in the original model, nothing
is altered until platforms’ have to choose their quality variable. That is, the analysis of the third

























∆θ(2β − β)2 + B1 + C
∆
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, if ∆θ ≤
2e(A+A)
−2 .















































∆θ(β − 2β)2 + B2 + C
∆
]











, if ∆θ ≤
2e(A+A)
−2 .
The necessary FOC of the ﬁrst line of Π1 identiﬁes a minimiser for ﬁrm 1 for any θ1 < θ2. Therefore
when a FOC binds, ﬁrm 1 has a strict incentive to jump to the boundary θ. Meanwhile as before,
dΠ2
d2 < 0 as in the proof of Claim 4. Hence maximal diﬀerentiation obtains when the FOC binds,
that is, when C is not too large. Let ˆ e denote the corresponding threshold on e; it is immediate
that ˆ e > e since C(e) is increasing in e and k is naught here. When e > ˆ e, a FOC fails to bind




2, θ2 = θ. But of course this fails to be an equilibrium as ﬁrm 2 is excluded. The analysis of
Propositions 8 and 3 carries through.
7.12 Comparative statics
Uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium renders the comparative statics exercise valid. For
the ﬁrst line, recall that θ∗
2 = θ is a strictly dominant strategy when an equilibrium exists, whence
θ∗


























Since ϕ′ ≥ 0 it is immediate that
d2∗
1

























































7.13 Proof of Proposition 7
When e is large enough platform 1 (the high-quality ﬁrm) prefers playing such that ∆θ =
2e(A+A)
−2 ≡
z(e) for any θ2 (and θ1 not so large as to induce negative proﬁts). Its payoﬀs when ∆θ ≤ z(e) are




























if ∆θ > z(e). Let π1(e,θ) = maxπ1(e,θ) for any pair θ1 > θ2 such that ∆θ = z(e). This is an
upper bound on ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts for any play by ﬁrm 2. Clearly π1(e,θ) is maximised for θ2 = θ.
Recall that we denote the corresponding value of θ1 by ˜ θ1. For any e and θ2,
@1(e;)
@1 > 0 when
∆θ < z(e) and
@1(e;)
@1 < 0 when ∆θ = z(e) and θ2 > θ. Therefore π1(e,θ) reaches zero for some
value θ′
1 ≤ θc








9 − 2kθ1 < 0, for ∆θ = z(e), θ2 > θ.
with max
@1(e;)







and therefore | ˜ θ1 − θc
1 |< z(e).
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